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Abstract
This paper aimed to empirically describe the power imbalances issues in setting the minimum 
wage in Bandung Regency and West Bandung Regency. Formally, Regional Wage Council has 
been established based on equality. However, several power imbalances have occurred within it. 
This paper also aimed to figure out the way to balance the power in collective decision making 
in the case of minimum wage setting. Furthermore, the research method used in this research 
was based on qualitative approach. Also, informants in this research were members of Regional 
Wage Council, employers in the industrial sector, and trade unions/labor unions in Bandung 
Regency and West Bandung Regency. The results of this study showed that power imbalances 
empirically existed in the setting of minimum wage. These imbalances were due to the issues of 
representatives, the number of members, information resources, and uncertainty. Moreover, power 
imbalances in the setting of minimum wage have led to the government’s more dominant role. 
Under these conditions, the effort required to overcome the problem of imbalance is by increasing 
trust in the government and the commitment of each party to the rules and collective agreements.
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collective bargaining; collective decision making; minimum wage; power imbalances
Introduction 
Power in employment relationship is the 
most popular issue in industrial relations. In 
fact, there are several papers on employment 
relationship. One report written by Hogbin 
(2006) conveys the difference of perspectives in 
employment relationship. The first perspective 
is the imbalance power between employers and 
employees. The second one refers to balancing 
the power of employers and employees through 
regulation of employment relationships. 
The next is on the most contemporary labor 
economist who affirms that supply and 
demand determine wage and the other work 
requirements. There should not be any reason 
to consider that employers have power upon 
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their employees. Both parties have their own 
degree of power to limit each other to stick with 
the agreement. 
Kaufman (2008) reports that there are 
two different paradigms in industrial relations 
studies, namely original industrial relations 
and modern industrial relations. The former 
concerns about the employment relationship, 
including labor union sector, human resources 
management and employment-management 
relationship. Meanwhile, the latter is about 
labor unions and related topics, such as 
collective bargaining, labor-management 
relations and national labor policy.  Referring 
to Kaufman (2008), the current paper regarding 
power imbalance aims to enrich the modern 
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industrial relations paradigm. This paper 
empirically describes industrial relations that 
focuses on collective bargaining that seeks to 
reach a consensus. Power imbalance can be 
one aspect that makes a consensus in collective 
bargaining difficult to reach. If this problem 
is not resolved, the objective of industrial 
relations will not be achieved.
Budd et al. (2004) report that the modelling 
of employment relationship as the issue of 
collective bargaining questions the distribution 
of resources and prevailing regulations on the 
interaction between employers and employees. 
As a result, companies, labor unions, public 
policy and procedures of dispute settlement 
are considered as critical institutions, and as 
the research subject in the relation of industrial 
pluralist. A study by Budd et al. (2004) is 
in line with the modern industrial relations 
paradigm and is an industrial pluralist view 
that emphasizes the importance of collective 
bargaining, including through structuring the 
distribution of resources and regulations.
In relation with the setting in  minimum 
wage, International Labor Organization 
(2008) reports that related institution facilitate 
the setting of minimum wage. Generally, in 
numerous countries, the wage setting is the form 
of governance, where there should be agreement 
and collective bargaining between the parties. 
Moreover, ILO (2013) states that collective 
bargaining in employment relationship should 
be etablished by negotiation. In the setting of 
minimum wage, collective bargaining should 
be performed in tripartite institution. ILO 
(2013) conveys the tripartite as the ”equal/
balance” interactive forum to solve problems 
through decision making.
Based on the concept of Hogbin (2006), 
the form of collective bargaining as stated by 
the International Labor Organization reinforces 
the second view of the power in employment 
relationship, namely balancing the power 
between employers and employees through 
regulation of employment relationships. Based 
on Kaufman (2008), collective bargaining in 
work relations is a modern industrial relations 
paradigm. Based on Budd et al. (2004), the 
concept of collective bargaining as stated by the 
International Labor Organization requires that 
regulations, negotiation procedures, and other 
conditions are in equal conditions to reach a 
consensus in decision making. 
The legal basis in setting the minimum 
wage in Indonesia is Law Number 13/2003 
on Labor. The minimum wage specified 
by the Governor and by concerning the 
recommendation proposed by Provincial Wage 
Council and/or Regent/Mayor. According 
to Presidential Decree Number 107/2004 on 
Regional Wage Council, Council refers to a 
tripartite non-structural institution that consists 
of government, employers’ association, trade 
unions and labor unions. On the basis of such 
regulations, it is implicitly stated that the forum 
of Regional Wage Council must be equal on 
the powers among its members. Such equality 
becomes what the entrepreneurs in Employers’ 
Association Indonesia believe in, that one of the 
purposes of the association is the establishment 
of industrial relations based on harmony, 
dynamism, justice and equality. 
Furthermore, this research focused on 
the setting of minimum wage in Bandung 
Regency and West Bandung Regency prior 
to the prevailing Government Regulation 
Number 78/2015 on Wage. Bandung Regency 
and West Bandung Regency are regions 
included in Metropolitan Bandung Raya, 
along with Bandung City, Cimahi City and 
Sumedang Regency. Based on the Bandung 
Regency Statistics Center (BPS), most of 
regions in Metropolitan Bandung Raya engage 
in the industrial sector. Bandung Regency 
is a region with the largest industrial sector 
(51.82%) compared to the other regions, 
followed by Cimahi City (47.41%) and West 
Bandung Regency (39.59%). Prior to 2007, 
Government of Bandung Regency was the 
master in labors’ wage within the area of West 
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Bandung Regency, Cimahi City and Sumedang 
Regency. In fact, West Bandung Regency is 
the result of expansion of Bandung Regency. 
Based on data from the Labor Office, after 
such expansion, labors made frequent strikes 
because of the policy difference between the 
government of Bandung Regency and West 
Bandung Regency. 
Actually, the setting of minimum wage in 
Bandung Regency and West Bandung Regency 
encountered a number of problems. A problem 
that occurred every year was the unachieved 
amicably deliberation. Based on data from the 
Activity Report of the Wage Council, there 
was also a difference found in the proposal of 
minimum wage between Apindo and labor 
unions in the Regional Wage Council. In the end, 
the labor unions’ strike occurred in response to 
the failure of an unachieved demand.  
Research on industrial relations in 
Indonesia was carried out mostly in the study 
of the original industrial relations paradigm. 
One of those studies was conducted by Ibrahim 
(2016), which emphasized the role of labor 
unions in providing protection and defending 
the rights of workers. Research conducted by 
Taufiq and Hidayat (2011) and also Utami (2013) 
concerned the role of labor unions in resolving 
disputes regarding termination of employment 
with companies. There are also various studies 
that have been carried out regarding collective 
bargaining, such as a study by Lamarche 
(2015) on collective bargaining in developing 
countries and a research by Kehinde et al. (2012) 
regarding collective bargaining in Nigeria. 
Both studies emphasized collective bargaining 
on a bipartite basis. A research on collective 
bargaining in wage determination was carried 
out by Hayter (2009), who expressed concerns 
that bipartite collective bargaining would 
reduce the wage structure and reduce income 
distribution, which was also related to the weak 
bargaining power of workers. 
The present study has several differences 
from previous studies. In addition to enriching 
the modern industrial relations paradigm, this 
research is also related to collective bargaining 
in the process of setting minimum wages 
carried out tripartite by focusing on power 
imbalances. 
Therefore, this study aimed to (1) provide 
an empirical description of the issues of power 
imbalances in the setting of minimum wage in 
Bandung Regency and West Bandung Regency, 
(2) figure out the way to balance the power 
in a collective decision making in the case of 
minimum wage setting.
Literature Review
In the paper proposed by Ackers (2014), 
he figures out that there are various perspectives 
in comprehending industrial relations. The 
Marxist perspective of industrial relations 
emphasizes the conflict of interest between 
capital and labor. The next one is Classical 
pluralist, which emphasizes the importance 
of collective bargaining in industrial relations. 
Thus, the Pluralist perspective in industrial 
relations emphasizes the equal balance of 
power. The other one is radical-pluralist, 
which emphasizes that each work relation 
refers to “economic exchange” and “power 
relationship” between the parties; in this case, 
the superiors and subordinates. However, 
superiors have greater resources than their 
subordinates. 
Ackers (2014) reports that in its current 
development, some objections are proposed 
against the perspective of radical pluralist. 
One of them is the fact that there are a lot of 
labor unions obtaining the sturdy bargaining 
power such as the labor unions’ strike. In short, 
the power balance may be altered because of 
the strike. There is a limited explanation on 
industrial relations by numerous perspectives, 
so Ackers chooses to convey his neo-pluralist 
perspective. This perspectives suggests five 
solutions to explain issues on power and conflict 
in industrial relations; they are: 1) a Weberian 
ideal type, 2) a neo-pluralist expansion, 3) a 
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historical institutional method, 4) a constructive 
approach to public policy: partnership at work, 
5) a normative vision.
In relation with the setting of minimum 
wage involving numerous parties, the writers 
refer to literatures on public policy. The 
involvement of multiple parties in a collective 
decision-making process is known as policy 
network, as conveyed by Howlett and Ramesh 
(1995), and Compston (2009). The other term 
on collective decision making is also called 
collaborative governance, as conveyed by 
Ansell and Gash (2007); Wanna and O’Flynn 
(2008); O’Leary, Slyke and Kim (2010); Choi 
and Robertson (2011). 
Howlett, Mukherjee, & Koppenjam (2015) 
report that the old concept of the theory of policy 
network may be comprehended in the pattern 
of interaction to many groups of society and 
governmental actors. The impact of the policy 
network is the function of its members’ power, 
in which it depends on the way to distribute 
the resources and the existence of “rules of the 
game” as the characteristics of policy network. 
As the effect, power distribution becomes a 
significant issue in formulating the policy.
Provan and Kenis (2008) denotes on 
the issue of power distribution in the form of 
network governance consisting of: participant 
governed, lead organization governed, 
and network administration organization 
governed. The form of this imbalance network 
is lead organization governed, and network 
administration organization governed.  
Based on Provan and Kenis (2008) in 
the previous paragraph, participant-governed 
network refers to the form of collective 
balance network, which is regulated by its 
own members. This form of network will be 
more effective to accomplish the outcome 
when trust is widely spread between the 
members and higher level of consensus. Lead 
Organization–Governed Networks means 
the extreme side of Participant-governed 
network. This form of network occurs when 
more powerful and less powerful parties exist 
at the same time. In this form, all network 
activities and decision making should be 
coordinated by the members or leader of the 
organization. The form of Lead Organization–
Governed Networks would be more effective 
to accomplish the outcome when the low 
degree of trust may be divided among the 
members and the higher degree one towards 
the centralization. The consensus should 
be in the low-intermediate one. Network 
Administrative Organization refers to the 
form of network containing separated units to 
regulate the network and its activities. Similar 
to Lead Organization–Governed Networks, 
this form of network should be centralized. 
Such separated units act as the facilitator in 
coordinating and maintaining the network. 
Provan and Milward (2001, p. 419) 
indicate that the power imbalances occur in 
a disproportionate organization in terms of 
resources or authority. This imbalance may also 
occur when one of the organizations directly 
control the fund to the other organization 
within the network. Furthermore, power 
imbalance is also discussed in collaborative 
governance. As addressed by Ansel and Gash 
(2007, p. 551), “If some stakeholders do not 
have the capacity, organization, status, or 
resources to participate, or to participate on 
an equal footing with other stakeholders, the 
collaborative governance process will be prone 
to manipulation by stronger actors.” Choi and 
Robertson (2011, p. 2) also considers that, “The 
decision process may still be dominated by the 
most powerful actors and interests pertinent to 
the situation being addressed.”
Based on these descriptions, power 
balance and imbalance can be seen from various 
aspects. Some aspects to analyze power balance 
and imbalance in collective decision making 
are: flow of funds in a network, form of the 
network, whether the network is decentralized 
or centralized with asymmetrical power 
(Provan and Kenis, 2008), the proportion in 
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term of resources or authority (Provan and 
Milward, 2001), capacity, organization, status, 
and resources to participate (Ansell and Gash, 
2007). In details, Ansell and Gash (2007) define 
the following several aspects to analyze the 
imbalances of this authority and resources: 1) 
representative organization in the collaboration 
process (Buanes et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 
1993), 2) the ability to negotiate (Gunton and 
Day, 2003; Lasker and Weiss 2003; Merkhofer, 
Conway, and Anderson 1997; Murdock, 
Wiessner, and Sexton 2005), and 3) time and 
energy allocated for collaboration (Yaffee and 
Wondolleck, 2003). 
Information and capacity by the 
actors also become the key resources in the 
formulation of collective policy. As Clarkson et 
al. (2007, p. 828) state, asymmetric information 
occurs when one of the parties has greater 
information relating to the condition provided 
to the other participating party. Huffman 
(2009, p. 1) expresses that, “With information 
being imperfect, the uniformed agents can 
easily make bad decisions.” The information 
asymmetry, and the capacity obtained among 
the actors would cause the uncertainty in the 
decision making and opportunistic behavior. 
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004, p. 6) show that 
uncertainty occurs when the actors are required 
to face the social problems and do not have any 
clue upon the effect of their effort in solving 
such problems. Qu and Loosemore (2013, pp. 
415-421) define opportunistic behavior as the 
self-interest with deceit. Also, this behavior 
occurs due to the uncertain environment, 
imperfect monitoring, asymmetric information, 
commitment insufficiency and self-gain. 
To solve asymmetric information, 
Clarkson et al. (2007, p. 829) reveal that the 
access to information through technology or 
education training may result in the intended 
solution.  In addition, Faria and Silva (2013, p. 
1088) state that such solution may be obtained 
through regulations and procedures to adopt 
transparent process. 
The key point  in  solving issues 
regarding power imbalances should be 
the development of effective collaborative 
governance conveying the way to facilitate 
the decision making among different 
stakeholders. Choi and Robertson (2011) 
think that consensus may help to balance the 
power among the stakeholders, but of course, 
with more resources, information, legitimacy 
and prestige so that they have sufficient 
capacity to establish the process of consensus 
development for their own interest. As the 
effect, to accomplish the consensus in decision 
making, the role of facilitators in balancing 
the authorities among the stakeholders is 
definitely required. As conveyed by Provan 
and Milward (2001);  Ansell and Gash (2007, 
p. 551), when the power imbalances arise, 
the role of leader as the element of successful 
collaboration is needed.
The present study uses the concepts of 
Ansell and Gash (2007) as a guidance theory, with 
several aspects to analyze power imbalances; 
namely: representative organizations, ability 
to negotiate, and resources to participate. 
Two of the decisive resources in the process 
of determining minimum wages are data and 
information. Therefore, this study uses the 
concept of information asymmetry related to 
uncertainty as stated by Clarkson et al. (2007).
Methods
The method used in this research was 
qualitative approach since the purpose of this 
research required the writers to explore. Such 
method was also chosen because it correlated 
with a number of characteristics contained 
in qualitative research based in Creswell 
(2009). Furthermore, the data in this research 
originated from field and secondary data. The 
writers collected the field data through: (1) 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews, 
and (2) observation, in which the writers 
conducted the observation as non-participant. 
In addition, the observation was conducted 
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during meetings on the setting of minimum 
wage for the 2015 Employee Minimum 
Wage in Bandung Regency. Meanwhile the 
secondary data was collected from (1) study 
of documentation (qualitative document) 
consisting of public documents (mass media, 
minutes and official reports from Regional 
Wage Council) and private documents (letters 
addressed to Regional Wage Council), and (2) 
study of literature.
The informants of this research were 
related parties of the setting of minimum wage 
consisting of: (1) Members of Regional Wage 
Council from the governmental elements: Office 
of Manpower of Bandung Regency and West 
Bandung Regency, (2) Members of Regional 
Wage Council from the representatives of 
the Bandung Regency Apindo (employers’ 
associations of Indonesia), (3) Members of 
Regional Wage Council from labor unions (SPSI 
and SPN), (4) Labor Unions (PUK, SPSI, PUK, 
SPN, PUK Gaspermindo, PUK SPBMI, and (5) 
Entrepreneurs in Bandung Regency. 
Meanwhile, the writers performed 
the data validation technique through the 
confirmation of statements by informants and 
the studied documents. The data testing in the 
technique of triangulation were the crosscheck 
medium towards the obtained data. Moreover, 
the data analysis includes the data preparation, 
coding (grouping based on the compiled 
theme, research findings and data reduction), 
narration and interpretation.
Results and Discussion
Formally, Regional Wage Council 
established on a trust that this forum is based 
on balance. In its implementation, the Wage 
Council is faced with the problem of power 
imbalances. The following are the empirical 
conditions of power imbalances in minimum 
wage setting in Bandung Regency and West 
Bandung Regency, as well as efforts made to 
balance power in collective decision making in 
minimum wage setting.
Representative Organizations 
The  Indonesian Government has 
developed infrastructures in this representation 
through several regulations including 
Presidential Decree No. 107/2004 on Regional 
Wage Council, Ministerial Decree No. 201/2001 
on Representation in Industrial Relations 
Institutions, and Regulation of Ministry of 
Manpower and Transmigration No. 6/2005 on 
Guideline on the Verification of Labor Union 
Membership.
Based on the Presidential Decree No. 
107/2004 on Regional Wage Council, the element 
of the members of Regional Wage Council 
consists of government, employers’ association, 
and labor union with the comparison 2:1:1 
added with higher educations and the experts. 
Subsequently, the member candidates must 
meet the following criteria: 
1. Be an Indonesian citizen 
2. Obtain a D3 degree at minimum. 
3. Have sufficient experience and insight in 
the field of payment and human resources 
development 
Based on the above regulation, the 
government of Bandung Regency and West 
Bandung Regency stipulate SP TSK SPSI and 
SPN as the representatives of labor unions in 
the region. The representatives of companies in 
Bandung Regency and West Bandung Regency 
for the members of Regional Wage Council are 
from Apindo of Bandung Regency and Apindo 
of West Bandung Regency.
The form of representative organization 
also depends on the perspectives by the other 
labor unions. Based on the results of the 
interview, the informant who was a member of 
the same trade union but not a member of the 
Wages Council stated that, “If the recruitment is 
carried out by involving the officers of work units in 
Bandung Regency in determining who will sit on 
the wage council with some sort of selection system, 
I think it will produce acceptable decisions. But in 
reality, now as if the membership of the wage council 
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was only directly appointed, does not consider the 
selection procedure.”
There are lots of perspectives by the Labor 
Unions, outside such union who represent the 
labors in Regional Wage Council. The informant 
stated that “The union members in the Wage 
Council are not satisfying, because most workers are 
bribed by Apindo.” Another informant expressed 
the same thing: “The union members in the Wage 
Council do not represent all workers, because they 
mostly have vested interest so that grassroots 
workers are not satisfied with them.” There are 
also different views from unions outside the 
wage council members; for example, one view 
is that union members in the Wage Council are 
considered to be fairly representative because 
they have a large number of members. As 
based on the results of interviews with other 
informants, who said, “Yes, right, representative. 
Because those who sit on the Wage Council are from 
unions with the most members.” 
In case of Apindo’s representation in 
the Council, entrepreneurs as the members 
of Apindo engaging in large-scale business 
consider that Apindo has represented the labor 
unions. An informant from a large company 
stated, “Apindo is highly representative, and is very 
dominant in negotiations to determine minimum 
wages. They must have certain requirements, so 
they have met the requirements.” However, the 
non-members of Apindo do not agree with 
the consideration. Different views are found 
among small and medium enterprises and are 
not members of Apindo. Informants from small 
companies stated, “Did not join Apindo, because 
Apindo members have to follow the minimum wage 
standard; if I follow the minimum wage but cannot 
compete at the same level as foreign companies, 
the factory will go bankrupt.” The same thing 
was stated by informants from medium-sized 
companies: “I do not know the benefits of being a 
member of Apindo, because it seems that business 
continuity must be resolved personally. Usually, the 
entrepreneurs who join Apindo are entrepreneurs 
who have large factories, entrepreneurs like me 
may not even be considered by organizations to be 
invited.” 
Based on the results of interviews with 
the Secretary of Apindo Bandung Regency, out 
of 1800 companies listed in Bandung Regency, 
only 78 companies joined Apindo (4.3%), and 
even then, it was dominated by large companies 
and a few medium-sized companies. The low 
condition of the company’s participation in 
Apindo also occurs at the provincial level. 
The chairman of Apindo West Java stated that 
there were thousands of companies in West 
Java that were not yet members of Apindo. 
The number of companies that are not yet 
members of Apindo is about three times the 
total membership.
Education and Negotiation Skill 
Based on the data in the Regent Decree 
Regarding the Membership of the Wage 
Council, the following is the composition of 
the membership and educational background 
of the Wage Council of Bandung Regency and 
Wage Council of West Bandung Regency.
As stated earlier that one of the 
requirements to become a member of the Wage 
Council is to have the lowest education of D3. 
So, it can be concluded that members of the 
Wage Council in Bandung Regency have met 
the education requirements. In the elements of 
government and Apindo in Bandung Regency, 
there are members who have an educational 
background in economics, so they understand 
the theory and issues regarding economics. In 
West Bandung Regency, there are members of 
the Wage Council who are from elements of 
workers’ organizations and who do not meet 
the education requirements. 
The selection for the members of Regional 
Wage Council from the labor union element 
must also be specified based on negotiation 
skill and the career path as the administrators of 
Head of Branch. According to the observation 
conducted during the meeting of Regional 
Wage Council, the writers figured out that all 
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members of the Council from labor unions 
had negotiation skill. The writer found out 
such skill based on the way they delivered 
the opinions as well as strategies. However, 
the negotiation skill was not followed by the 
insight and measurement of the condition of 
macro-economy as the basis of measurement 
in setting the minimum wage. In relation to 
the process of such recruitment, the education 
was not included as an absolute requirement, 
since the Head of Branch directly determined 
the result. 
Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty 
Based on observations on the minimum 
wage setting meeting, in the process of the 
setting of minimum wage, Apindo would have 
information in relation with the company’s 
condition. Also, during such process, the 
Apindo frequently state that the companies’ 
condition is not well, and they propose the 
value of minimum wage within the lower 
limit, but without describing the company’s 
data. Although such information is confidential 
and not considered as the measurement in 
setting the minimum wage, transparency 
upon the company’s condition becomes one 
determiner in setting the minimum wage and 
may result in trust improvement between the 
parties.  Information asymmetry in setting the 
minimum wage occurs when the other party 
is not able to access private information. This 
is somehow in line with Huffman (2009, p. 3) 
who states that private information is a type of 
information asymmetry. 
Other than information asymmetry, the 
setting of minimum wage in Bandung Regency 
and West Bandung Regency must also face 
uncertainty. Uncertainty originates from the 
insufficient capacity (education obtained by 
Table 1.
Membership Composition and Educational Background of the Wage Council of Bandung 
Regency and Wage Council of West Bandung Regency
No
Wage Council of Bandung Regency (2015-2018) Wage Council of West Bandung Regency (2014-2017)
Organization Unit Educational Background Organization Unit
Educational 
Background
I Government Government
1. Head of Manpower Office Master 1.   Head of Social, Manpower and 
Transmigration Office
Master
2. Manpower Office Master 2.   Office of Social, Manpower and 
Transmigration Working 
Master
3. Manpower Office Master 3.   Law Section of Regional Secretariat Masters
4. Central Statistics Agency Bachelor 4.   Central Statistics Agency Bachelor
5. Office of Cooperatives, SMEs, 
Trade and Industry 
Bachelor 5.   Regional Development Planning 
Board 
Bachelor
6. Law Section of Regional 
Secretariat
Bachelor 6.   Office of Industry, Trade, 
Cooperative and SME
Bachelor
7. Economic Coordination Section 
of Regional Secretariat 
Magister
8. Manpower Office Magister
II Apindo of Bandung Regency 1 Master and 
3 Bachelor
Apindo of West Bandung Regency 3 Bachelor
III Labor Unions 1 Master and 
3 Bachelor
Labor Unions 3 High School
IV Experts/ College Masters Experts /College Doctoral
Total Number 17 people 13 people
Source: Processed from Bandung Regent Decision Regarding Membership of Bandung Regency Wage 
Council Year of 2015-2018, and West Bandung Regent Decision Regarding Board Structure and 
Personnel West Bandung Regency Wage Year of 2014-2017.
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the involved party) and information. This 
uncertainty also occurs when the parties have 
different perceptions due to different reference 
or interpretation (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004).
Uncertainty occurs in relation with the 
formulation in setting the minimum wage. 
Law No. 13/2003 Article 89 states that the 
“Government shall specify the minimum 
wage based on the appropriate necessity 
of life and by considering the productivity 
and economic growth.” Other than multiple 
interpretations towards the formulation in 
setting the minimum wage, the data of macro 
economy is considered less supporting. The 
data of economy and statistics related to the 
setting of minimum wage is centralized in 
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS). The problem 
arises when the data issuance by BPS is 
considered as inaccurate by Apindo. Somehow, 
Apindo are more critical against the data issued 
by BPS. 
Implications of Power Imbalances in Setting 
the Minimum Wage 
Based on observations of the minimum 
wage setting meeting and based on the author’s 
analysis, the imbalances in setting the minimum 
wage, particularly in education and capacity 
sides, as well as the information asymmetry 
and uncertainty, results in less irrational setting 
of minimum wage. In other words, the setting 
would not be based on the measurement of 
minimum wage, since the formulation may 
cause multiple interpretation, and the less 
supporting data issued by BPS. To reduce such 
uncertainty, the parties use such strategy as 
formulation by negotiation. 
This condition is in line with a statement 
from Ostrom and Ostrom (1971), which says 
that when uncertainty occurs, individuals will 
adopt a series of diverse strategies to reduce 
the level of uncertainty. The application of this 
strategy shows a less rational decision-making 
process. The implications of power imbalances 
in determining minimum wages also lead to 
opportunistic behavior. As stated by Qu and 
Loosemore (2013), opportunistic behavior arises 
from environmental uncertainty, imperfect 
supervision, information asymmetry, lack of 
commitment, and self-seeking interests. 
Apindo use an economic principle so 
that they propose a low value of minimum 
wage. Meanwhile, labor unions propose a 
higher value to accomplish the wellbeing. This 
proposal of higher value is also supported by 
the other labor unions in the agglomeration 
area of Metropolitan Bandung Raya. In the 
event a proposal fails, they go on strike for what 
they believe in. 
This action by Labor Unions affects the 
process of the setting of minimum wage. In 
Bandung Regency, the setting in minimum 
wage in 2013 was specified by the regent. Similar 
to it, the governor specified the minimum wage 
in 2014 and 2015. Such changes were due to the 
strike by labor unions. In the end, it resulted in 
Apindo’s distrust to labor unions. Such distrust 
apparently affected the setting of minimum 
wage in the following year. Negotiation was 
no longer used since Apindo worried that the 
government would change the decision. At last, 
the consensus would be more difficult to reach. 
Conditions in West Bandung Regency are not 
more conducive than in Bandung Regency. 
More strikes occur in West Bandung Regency 
compared to Bandung Regency, and consensus 
is more difficult to achieve.
From this case of setting minimum wages, 
it can be seen that there are various implications 
of power imbalances. The implication of 
power imbalances is that more decisions are 
made based on the strategies of each party so 
that decision making becomes less rational. 
Because decision is made predominantly based 
on strategy, a consensus is more difficult to 
achieve, and going on strike appears as a form 
of disagreement. In conditions of regulations 
that are difficult to enforce, there will be 
more opportunistic behavior. This continuing 
condition, in the long run, creates distrust and 
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Chart 1.
Conditions of Power Imbalances in Bandung Regency and West Regency and 
Their Implications on Collective Decision Making
Source : obtained from data analysis
Chart 1 
Conditions of Power Imbalances i  Bandung Regency and West Regency and Their 
Implications on Collective Decision Making 
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makes collective bargaining more difficult. The 
power imbalances’ conditions in determining 
minimum wages in Bandung Regency and 
West Bandung Regency and their implications 
in collective decision making are illustrated in 
the following chart 1.
Efforts to Overcome Power Imbalances in 
Collective Decision Making
Bandung Regency is an interesting case 
in an effort to overcome power imbalances. 
Although there are differences in power and 
problems in minimum wage determination in 
Bandung Regency, history shows that there are 
efforts from all parties involved to achieve better 
industrial relations in the region. Based on the 
author’s analysis of the results of observation, 
interviews and comparing the Activity Report 
of the Wage Council of Bandung Regency and 
West Bandung Regency, The Wage Council 
of Bandung Regency has an institution that is 
better organized. There is clarity of regulations 
in various stages of activities and the formation 
of regulations are mutually made based on 
consensus. Bandung Regency also has a more 
balanced position of power compared to West 
Bandung Regency.  Bandung Regency often gets 
visits from other regional Wage Councils because 
they are considered conducive in wage setting.
The Wage Council of Bandung Regency 
was once an exclusive forum in determining 
minimum wages in 2012, where there was no 
change in the value of wages by either the regent 
or the governor. As a result, in determining the 
minimum wage for the following year, namely 
in 2013, an agreement was reached within the 
Wage Council through the negotiation process 
in the recommendation for the first wage. 
Consensus can be achieved because 
it prioritizes dialogue in various stages of 
minimum wage determination, namely 
starting from the rules, Decent Living Needs 
(KHL) determination, and minimum wage 
determination. Conduciveness at that time can 
occur because each party respects the results of 
the decision, in the sense that there is no change 
in recommendations, either by the regent or 
by the governor. Another key to success in 
overcoming the problem of power imbalances 
is the role of the leader, who can embrace all 
parties so that they get support from all parties. 
Referring to Ansell and Gash (2007), leadership 
is important to establish and maintain clear 
basic rules, build trust, facilitate dialogue, and 
explore mutual benefits. 
Consensus can be achieved in the cases 
of minimum wage determination in 2012 and 
2013. However, the community is still faced 
with strikes carried out by unions in Bandung 
Regency. Actually, the strike carried out was a 
form of union solidarity with other regions in 
Metropolitan Bandung Raya, which was the effect 
of agglomeration. The strike was not intended 
for the Bandung Regency Government, but was 
carried out as a form of solidarity with other 
unions in the Metropolitan Bandung Raya.
Since the determination of the 2016 
minimum wage, the central government has set 
a step to overcome various problems in setting 
minimum wages through the establishment of 
Government Regulation Number 78/2015 on 
Wage. This government regulation seems to 
reduce the involvement of local governments 
in determining minimum wages. The social 
learning aspect at the regency/city government 
level is meaningless because there is a lack of 
democratic processes and collective bargaining 
to achieve a solution where all parties benefit. 
Caraway and Ford’s research (2017) revealed 
that through Government Regulation Number 
78/2015 on Wage, national governments took 
action to weaken trade unions, avoiding the 
wage council by increasing wages according 
to the formula based on inflation and growth 
in gross domestic product. This may lead to 
weaken cooperation in the industrial field.
Conclusion
The first conclusion of the present study is 
that the setting of minimum wages in Indonesia 
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through the Wage Council is included in the 
form of a lead organization governed, that is 
an imbalance form of network where there 
are strong parties and weak parties. Strong 
parties are from the government element. The 
government facilitates activities, is responsible 
for funds, and has a composition of more 
members so that they will be able to determine 
decisions if there is a vote. The government 
also has a decisive role because the minimum 
wage is set by the governor through the 
recommendation of the regent. Employers are 
often considered to be stronger because they 
have capital and information resources. But 
empirically, the labor union has the power 
of being representative and through strikes 
involving a large group of people. The strength 
of the labor union also comes from solidarity 
in the Metropolitan Bandung Raya. In this 
regard, this study has limitations, as it has not 
revealed how the strength of regional solidarity 
can be formed, and what factors or motives 
encourage workers to form calculated forces. 
This condition is certainly different from the 
employers’ organization, where there is a lack 
of solidarity even though it is in the same area, 
which is Metropolitan Bandung Raya.
Minimum wage setting in Indonesia is 
an imbalance form. Conditions in Bandung 
Regency are more balanced than in West 
Bandung Regency. From this case, it can be 
concluded that in more imbalanced conditions, 
there will be more strikes, the potential for 
conflict will be greater, a consensus will be 
more difficult to produce, and the process of 
collective decision making will be irrational. 
The second conclusion of this study is that 
power imbalances can be overcome through the 
formation of a consensus among the parties 
involved and institutional arrangements. 
When power imbalances occur, information 
asymmetry occurs and there is low trust 
among stakeholders. Thus, trust in the leader 
is needed. Leaders play a role in balancing 
strength among stakeholders, one of which is 
to ensure the achievement of a consensus, and 
ensure that agreed rules can be implemented 
properly. A consensus is also formed through 
better institutional arrangement, agreement 
with rules, clarity of rules in the process of 
collective decision making, and data and 
information support. Another aspect that also 
determines is the commitment and willingness 
of each party to comply with and accept the 
results of the decision.
There are two suggestions proposed 
based on the findings of this study. Firstly, one 
suggestion from a practical point of view is to 
maintain collective bargaining in industrial 
relations, especially in determining minimum 
wages as intended by the International Labor 
Organization (2008, 2013). Power imbalances 
cannot be overcome by eliminating the role 
of the parties involved, but through better 
institutional arrangements. This is intended 
to create harmonious, dynamic and equitable 
industrial relations based on the principles of 
Pancasila democracy. Secondly, the results of 
this study present a phenomenon regarding 
regional strength (agglomeration) as one 
aspect that can be reasonably calculated. A 
second suggestion for further study is to study 
more comprehensively about the concept of 
agglomeration or spatial interaction so that it 
can form both economic power and solidarity 
in a region. 
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